Money Stuff: Not Your Keys, Not Your DAT
- Matt Levine at Bloomberg Opinion <noreply@news.bloomberg.com>
- Hidden Recipient <hidden@emailshot.io>
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![]() ![]() Programming note: We want to hear from you. Please take our quick reader survey. Bitcoin oopsieFor a while last year, the US stock market would pay $2 for $1 of Bitcoin. It is hard to convey now how weird that time was. If you ran a tiny public company in mid-2025, the very best thing you could do was acquire $100 million of Bitcoin to add $200 million to your market capitalization. If you happened to have $100 million worth of Bitcoin in mid-2025, the very best thing you could do was to plop it into a tiny public company in exchange for $200 million worth of stock. These companies were called “digital asset treasury companies,” or DATs. Everyone kind of knew this couldn’t last (it didn’t), so there was a mad rush to get these trades done before the party ended. In September 2025, a company called Datavault AI Inc. got into this game. Sort of. Datavault was a small public company, “a leader in AI-driven data visualization, valuation and monetization.” In mid-September, it had about 116.7 million shares outstanding, trading at around $0.30 per share, for a market capitalization in the ballpark of $35 million. On Sept. 25, it announced that it was selling 278.9 million shares, at a price of $0.5378 per share, to Scilex Holding Co., another public company focused on “acquiring, developing and commercializing non-opioid pain management products for the treatment of acute and chronic pain and neurodegenerative and cardiometabolic disease.”[1] Scilex was paying the purchase price in Bitcoin, valued at $112,915.52 per Bitcoin, meaning that Datavault got about 1,309 Bitcoin for its stock.[2] The stock promptly shot up, hitting a high of $3.118 in October, for a market capitalization of about $973 million. Datavault did not, as far as I can tell, call itself a “Bitcoin treasury company” or DAT, and the announcement of the deal focused on its strategic goals, not the Bitcoin stuff. A sample:
Still it was a big slug of Bitcoin. In round numbers, putting $150 million of Bitcoin into Datavault immediately added $900 million to its stock market value. Wild times! The wild times didn’t last, of course. The price of Bitcoin fell, DAT premiums collapsed, and by January Datavault had sold 491 Bitcoins back to Scilex for $40.5 million, about a 27% discount to the price four months earlier. (It moved on to other things, like a “dividend of Dream Bowl Meme Coin II tokens.“) By the end of June, the date of its most recent financial statements, Datavault reported holding 837 Bitcoin, with a fair value of about $49 million. It reported total assets of about $277 million, with stockholders’ equity of about $246 million, so it is no longer especially a Bitcoin company. This Monday, Datavault’s stock closed at $0.1328 per share, for a market cap of about $126 million. (It has issued more stock, and currently has about 950 million shares outstanding.) Never mind. But there is a hilarious coda to this story: Actually Datavault never got any Bitcoins at all. Yesterday it announced that its financial statements for the past year or so “should no longer be relied upon,” because (emphasis added):
That is: In the original deal with Scilex, Datavault gave Scilex stock and Scilex gave Datavault 1,309 Bitcoins at Biconomy, a large crypto exchange. Datavault did not own those Bitcoins on the Bitcoin blockchain; it owned them in an account on the ledger of Biconomy. Over time, it sold some of them back to Scilex for cash, again in transfers on Biconomy (not the blockchain). And then, this June, Datavault tried to take its remaining Bitcoins out of Biconomy and, uh, has “been unable to complete the withdrawal.” Its accountants concluded that it never had the Bitcoins at all: They “did not meet the requirements for recognition as a digital asset of the Company.” They were entries on a ledger at Biconomy, but when Datavault tried to turn them into actual on-chain Bitcoins, it couldn’t. Oops! The stock closed down 50% yesterday. I don’t know what to tell you. “CoinDesk contacted Biconomy about the withdrawal request,” but has not yet reported a response. It is not clear what happened. Maybe nothing; maybe the Bitcoins are all there, this is all a misunderstanding (since June?) and it’s all fine. But it does kind of seem like, for a while last year, the US stock market would pay $2 for $0 worth of Bitcoin. People are worried about non-GAAP accountingWe talked a bit last week about Anthropic PBC’s first-half net loss of about $80.7 billion. Virtually all of that net loss was caused by changes in fair value of some stock-based instruments (convertible notes and preferred stock and purchase agreements) that Anthropic had previously sold, largely to Google and Amazon. Essentially Anthropic sold those investors some stock, the stock went up by about $80 billion in the first half, those investors had about $80 billion of profit, and so Anthropic had about $80 billion of loss, which flows through its income statement. I tried to point out that that’s weird. Most of the time, when a company issues stock and the stock goes up, it does not recognize a loss under US generally accepted accounting principles. Anthropic has a GAAP loss because these instruments are not quite stock; they have weird provisions that make them partially “derivative liabilities” under GAAP and thus require mark-to-market accounting. For most practical purposes, these instruments are stock, but as a technical accounting matter they are treated as mark-to-market liabilities. But if they were just regular stock, they would not have created any accounting loss, and when they eventually convert into regular stock they will stop being marked to market. It seems to me that this is a case in which US GAAP creates a misleading picture of the company’s economic profitability. The story here is something like “we basically broke even in our business, but because we issued some weird stock, we have an $80 billion non-cash accounting loss reflecting the fact that our stock went up.” But the stock going up is a good thing! And so in fact the general reaction to Anthropic’s financials has been positive, and analysts talk about “an adjusted net income of about $US2.7 billion,” adjusting out those mark-to-market losses. Because the mark-to-market losses do not tell you anything useful about Anthropic’s actual profitability. There is, however, a widespread perception that US GAAP is objectively correct, and that if a company reports “adjusted” (non-GAAP) results, it is doing something tricky and misleading. At the Wall Street Journal, Jonathan Weil writes:
But this is a coincidence. It happens to be the case that $80 billion of the increase in Anthropic’s stock value in 2026 counts as a mark-to-market loss for Anthropic, under US GAAP. But most of the increase in Anthropic’s stock value, over the past few years, does not count as a mark-to-market loss for Anthropic, and it would be weird if it did. “On the other side of the ledger,” various Anthropic investors have $1.5 trillion or whatever of gains from owning Anthropic stock, of which $80 billion reflects GAAP losses for Anthropic and $1.42 trillion doesn’t. The $80 billion of GAAP losses are a genuinely weird exception to the normal rule that, when a company issues stock and the stock goes up, that does not create an accounting loss for the company. On the other hand, when a company issues stock and the stock goes up, that does generally create an accounting gain for the owners of the stock. There is nothing weird about this asymmetry: If an investment bank makes money by trading stocks, everyone understands that that’s income for the bank, but there’s no offsetting loss for the issuers of that stock. That said, it is a choice in the accounting rules: It used to be, under US GAAP, that most companies did not report income when stocks they owned went up, but in 2016 that rule was changed, and now they do. Warren Buffett complained a lot about this at the time, arguing that it would “severely distort Berkshire’s net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors.” I disagree: “I bought stocks that went up, so I have income” seems basically normal and correct, in a way that “Anthropic issued stock that went up, so it has a loss” does not. But if you’re used to treating unrealized stock gains as not income, then treating them as income might seem misleading. Generally, though, it seems intuitive to me that:
This is about accounting, but there is also something importantly true about it as an economic matter. If investors have made $1.5 trillion by investing in Anthropic, that’s not because Anthropic lost $1.5 trillion. It’s because Anthropic created $1.5 trillion of value, which is shared with its investors. Stock investing — unlike some asset classes I could name[4] — is positive-sum, and making money in stock investing does not require anyone else to lose money. Buy borrow dieEventually no one will pay capital gains taxes in the US. The general rule is that you pay capital gains taxes when you sell stock (for more than you paid for it), so the way to avoid capital gains taxes is to never sell stock. There are two main reasons you might want to sell stock:
So the trick is do those things — rebalance your portfolio and fund your lifestyle — without selling stock. The first problem is solved, and we have discussed it a few times recently. The trick is that, while you have to sell stock if you want to get rid of it and buy another stock, an exchange-traded fund doesn’t have to do that. An ETF can get rid of stock it doesn’t like in an “in-kind redemption,” acquire new stock in an “in-kind creation,” and not pay taxes on the transaction. This is a weird and possibly accidental quirk of US tax law, but at this point it is quite robust. “But I’m not an ETF,” you say, but that is a minor quibble. You can become an ETF: Someone creates an ETF for you, you contribute your stocks to the ETF, boom, you’re an ETF and never need to pay taxes to adjust your holdings. This is called a “351 exchange ETF.” Now. There are two problems with this. One is that it is expensive and complicated to create an ETF, and you probably can’t do this with a $10,000 portfolio to avoid $500 of capital gains taxes. But over time that obstacle will go away: All of this stuff will get productized, automated, and cheaper. As with many tax trades — as with many trades, generally — this starts off as a bespoke expensive trade for very rich people, and ends up commoditized and available to everyone. The other problem is that the Internal Revenue Service recently announced a crackdown on too-cute versions of this trade; we talked about it last month. It is not yet clear to me how thorough this crackdown will be; the result might be “in fact you cannot generally avoid capital gains taxes on rebalancing your portfolio,” or it might be more like “you need to pronounce the right incantations and wait three months and then it’s fine.” The second problem is also largely solved. The standard solution is called “buy borrow die,” and it goes like this:
Again, an extremely well-known approach. Again, there are occasional proposals to crack down on it — wealth-tax proposals are, deep down, kind of about buy borrow die, and occasionally politicians propose more direct approaches — but again it seems pretty robust. And, again, this is the sort of thing that starts as a bespoke trade for billionaires but is actually pretty easy to roll out to everyone. In fact, it is arguably easier to offer this to retail customers than to billionaires, because the retail customers are more diversified. If you have one billionaire client who owns 30% of the company she founded, lending her 50% of the value of her stake — 15% of the value of the company — is a concentrated risk and a complex credit decision. But if you have a million normal customers all of whom own some stocks, their overall portfolio is going to look like the stock index,[6] and lending 50% of the value of that portfolio will be pretty straightforward. Here’s a Wall Street Journal story about the commoditization of buy borrow die:
Right, these days it would be kind of weird to pay capital gains taxes. The technology exists not to. Incidentally, people sometimes worry about stock market leverage. A lot of stock market leverage has the basic flavor of people seeking higher risk: Retail margin trading, leveraged ETFs, hedge-fund prime brokerage, etc., all basically involve investors borrowing more money to increase their bets on stocks. But some stock market leverage is more like this: People borrowing half the value of their portfolios, not to increase their bets, but to increase their consumption without paying taxes. Sports betsHere is a Wall Street Journal op-ed by Tarek Mansour of Kalshi, arguing that sports bets on prediction markets are totally different from sports bets on sportsbooks. It covers the usual arguments. Kalshi, unlike sportsbooks, has no “house” that wins when retail customers lose. (Market makers might quibble.) Bars can hedge their beer sales by betting against the local team on Kalshi, but “few hedge risk by putting a sportsbook bet on their profit-and-loss statements.” (Mattress Mack has been hedging at sportsbooks for years.) Etc. But the argument that drives me particularly crazy is that we need federal regulation for sports bets:
That’s not really true, though. It’s true of some states: Some states that are fine with state-regulated sportsbooks sued Kalshi for ignoring their state gaming regulations.[7] But, for instance, Utah sued Kalshi for offering illegal gambling, and Utah is not fine with sportsbooks. Its attorney general said:
Mansour’s argument is that “national markets require national regulation,” and it would be silly for sports gambling to be regulated by the states. But sports gambling has been regulated by the states for almost the entirety of US history. Utah has banned sports gambling — in its constitution — for as long as it has been a state. Until this year, nobody thought that that was odd. Nobody thought “we need federal sports gambling regulation to avoid fragmenting sports gambling liquidity.” Nobody thought that Utah’s constitution violated federal law. In 2018, the US Supreme Court ruled that states can regulate sports gambling; nobody at the time argued that the the Commodity Exchange Act prohibited that. Kalshi, and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, have discovered an entirely new area of constitutional law, in which century-old state laws about sports gambling are invalid because they conflict with the important federal interest in offering 18-year-olds liquid nationwide sports gambling markets. It’s so weird! Things happenWall Street’s AI Debt Machine Is Starting to Choke on Supply. How Weil Gotshal, One of Wall Street’s Most Storied Law Firms, Ended Up in Chaos. Nelson Peltz’s Trian Offers to Buy Wendy’s for $1.4 Billion. ETFs use ‘perps’ to offer bets on private companies such as Anthropic and OpenAI. (Earlier.) JPMorgan’s Skyscraper on Park Avenue Estimated to Cost Around $6 Billion. McKinsey, BCG Boost Starting Salaries for New Hires in US. US MBA Applications Plunge 27% as International Demand Drops. Home Buyers Who Enjoyed Cheap Adjustable Mortgages Are Now Getting a Nasty Shock. AI maths advances raise fears over security of global encryption. Where Have All the Car Commercials Gone? Polymarket’s top trader is sports gambler ‘Swiss Tony.’ “Walking a robot dog paid around the same hourly rate as that for the flesh-and-blood variety.” If you’d like to get Money Stuff in handy email form, right in your inbox, please subscribe at this link. Or you can subscribe to Money Stuff and other great Bloomberg newsletters here. Thanks! ![]() [1] Incidentally, this is not the first weird situation involving Scilex that we have discussed around here. [2] Datavault was selling other stock in other transactions, and by the time the deal closed in November, Scilex owned about 265 million shares, out of about 552 million outstanding, for about 48%. [3] See the next section. [4] See the last section. [5] The Wall Street Journal says that “the average loan to value is around 50%, while the charge for the borrower is around 1 percentage point over benchmark rates.” Realistically you’d borrow at a floating rate; I’m using 6% — a bit more than 100 basis points over long-term SOFR swaps — for simplicity. [6] I mean, if you’re a wealth manager in California, it’s plausibly going to look like a portfolio of the five biggest AI companies. But otherwise. [7] Those gaming regulations, notably, usually restrict sports gambling to customers who are at least 21 years old; Kalshi’s federally regulated sports bets are open to 18-year-olds. States might worry that 18-year-olds are more prone to addiction than 21-year-olds, and that federal sports gambling regulation is not particularly focused on addiction risk. Follow Us You received this message because you are subscribed to Bloomberg’s Money Stuff newsletter. If a friend forwarded you this message, sign up here to get it in your inbox.
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