Money Stuff: Musk’s Mars Merger Pay
- Matt Levine at Bloomberg Opinion <noreply@news.bloomberg.com>
- Hidden Recipient <hidden@emailshot.io>
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![]() ![]() Programming note: We want to hear from you. Please take our quick reader survey. SpaceX/Tesla comp packagesElon Musk is the chief executive officer and “Technoking” of Tesla Inc. He has a long-term performance incentive plan. Here are Tesla’s summary of the plan and the plan agreement. The gist of it is that Musk is will get about 423.7 million shares of stock — about 12% of Tesla — in 12 tranches, each of which unlocks when Tesla hits (1) a market capitalization milestone and (2) an operational milestone.[1] The market cap milestones start at $2 trillion and go up to $8.5 trillion,[2] and the operational milestones include eight annual earnings thresholds ($50 billion up to $400 billion of adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization[3]) and four product thresholds: “20 Million Tesla Vehicles Delivered,” “10 Million Active FSD [fully self-driving] Subscriptions,” “1 Million Bots Delivered” and “1 Million Robotaxis in Commercial Operation.” Any shares he earns vest in March 2033 (if he earns them by 2030) or September 2035 (if he earns them afterwards); if he leaves Tesla before any shares vest, he forfeits them. If Musk earns all of the shares, at an $8.5 trillion market capitalization, the award will be worth a bit more than $1 trillion. If Tesla does any big acquisitions, the award thresholds will be adjusted in straightforward arithmetic ways:
“Upon a change in control of Tesla, such as a merger with or purchase by another company, any Earned Shares under the 2025 CEO Performance Award will vest,” evaluated using the merger value as the market capitalization, but “any Unearned Shares that do not become Earned Shares as a result of the change in control will be automatically forfeited.” So if Tesla is acquired at a $3 trillion valuation, that will satisfy the first three market cap milestones ($2 trillion, $2.5 trillion and $3 trillion), but will make him ineligible for the remaining nine tranches. If Tesla is acquired at its current valuation — about $1.5 trillion — then Musk will forfeit the entire award. A “change in control” is a transaction in which Tesla is acquired by someone else; in particular, a merger in which Tesla is the acquired (i.e., smaller) company would probably be a change in control.[4] Elon Musk is the chief executive officer of Space Exploration Technologies Corp. He has a long-term performance incentive plan. Here are SpaceX’s summary of the plan, the original award agreement from January, a modification to the agreement from March to reflect SpaceX’s acquisition of xAI, and SpaceX’s general equity compensation plan. The gist of it now is that Musk will get up to about 1.3 billion shares of SpaceX, in a variety of tranches, contingent on hitting market capitalization milestones ranging from about $1.065 trillion to $7.5 trillion. Most of the shares are also contingent on “the Company’s establishment of a permanent human colony on Mars with at least one million inhabitants,” but some are instead contingent on “the Company’s completion of non-Earth-based data centers capable of delivering 100 terawatts of compute per year.” None of the shares can be awarded unless at least one of those milestones is hit; market cap alone is not enough. If SpaceX does any acquisitions, the board can adjust the market cap milestones. This is less mechanical than the Tesla award, just “the Board (or a designated committee thereof) may equitably adjust the Market Capitalization Milestone in the event of material corporate actions, acquisitions or dispositions.” The Mars-colony and space-data-center milestones do not adjust. You could imagine that, if SpaceX had a 600,000-person Mars colony and it acquired another company with a 450,000-person Mars colony, the threshold really should be adjusted; otherwise Musk could meet the Mars-colony-population requirement by Mars-colony acquisition rather than by organic Mars colonization. But I can understand why the board did not actually negotiate for that adjustment. The plan does not generally provide for accelerated vesting on a change in control. So what happens if SpaceX and Tesla merge, as they are considering? Well, it depends on exactly how the deal works, but I would assume that:
On those assumptions:
So, to get his full SpaceX pay package after the merger, Musk would need to get the company to about a $13 trillion valuation. And put 100 terawatts of data centers in space. And put a million people on Mars. If he did that, the pay package would be worth on the order of $1 trillion or so, hey, great. Also, though, if he did that, his existing equity stake in the combined company — a bit more than one-third of the stock — would be worth more than $4 trillion. Also, if SpaceX got to a $13 trillion valuation without the Mars colony or the space data centers, his existing stake would be worth more than $4 trillion. Owning one-third of a giant company is pretty valuable, with or without Mars colonies. That said, all of this is pretty discretionary. The boards of Tesla and SpaceX could demand that Musk reduce his pay package in any merger. Or they could grant him some extra pay for doing the merger. I guess my point is that you shouldn’t worry too much about Elon Musk’s moonshot pay packages, in the context of a potential SpaceX/Tesla merger. Like:
MidCapHere’s some dumb business development company math. Let’s say I run a publicly traded BDC, a closed-end private credit fund open to retail investors. Like a lot of BDCs, mine trades at a big discount to its net asset value: My financial statements say that my BDC is worth $100 per share, but its stock trades at $70 per share. You run a different public BDC, which also trades at a discount. Your BDC has a net asset value of $10 per share, and it trades at $8. I am tired of getting complaints about my BDC and I would like to get rid of it. I decide to sell it to you. How much should you pay for it? Some options include:
Let’s say we agree on $90 per share: You get a 10% discount, buying my loans for less than their fair value, but my shareholders get a 29% premium, selling their shares for more than their market value. How do you pay? Well, you could write me a check for $90 per share. But realistically this is going to be a mostly stock deal: My BDC will be folded into yours, and my BDC’s shareholders will become shareholders of the combined BDC. So you will issue shares of your BDC to pay for my BDC. How many? Well. You owe my shareholders $90 for each share of my BDC. Your BDC has a net asset value of $10 per share. So, 9 shares of your BDC would be worth $90. Right? Oh of course your BDC trades at $8 per share, so 9 shares would have a market value of $72. But it’s worth $10 per share. So 9 shares. The point is that:
Is that something? I dunno. Anyway:
Here’s the statement. The consideration is “approximately $1.21 per share in cash, provided by a subsidiary of Ares Management, and approximately $9.67 per share in Ares Capital common stock,” adjusted for a cash special dividend. The shares of Ares Capital common stock “will be calculated based on an exchange ratio using a value for the Ares Capital common stock equal to the greater of (i) Ares Capital’s NAV per share prior to closing and (ii) Ares Capital’s share price.” MidCap’s “preliminary estimate of net asset value per share as of September 30, 2026, is approximately $12.86.” Ares Capital’s net asset value per share is $19.31; the stock closed at $18.61 yesterday, about a 4% discount. So:
Ares Capital trades at quite a small discount, so the effect here is not that notable; it is hardly worth discussing the difference between Ares Capital’s stock price and NAV. But it does seem like there will be more BDC consolidation, and many public BDCs trade at larger discounts. And when they announce acquisitions, they will probably use their net asset values in reporting the deal value, not their trading prices.[7] Pattern day tradingMy general model is:
We have talked about this model frequently. We used to talk about it a lot because “payment for order flow” — the thing in Step 3 where market makers pay brokers to trade with their retail customers — was controversial and mysterious; people thought that the market makers were front-running the retail orders, and I had to keep explaining, no, the market makers just really like collecting the spread trading against random orders. More recently, though, we talk about it a lot because brokers and market makers are in the business of encouraging more trading. On this simple model, market makers’ and brokers’ profits go up as retail trading frequency goes up, at the expense of the retail traders. So the game is to get retail traders to trade more. How do you do that? Well:
The point that I want to make here is that this model is blindingly obvious and absolutely everyone knows it, except I guess for some (not all!) retail day traders, though some people’s businesses depend on pretending not to know it.[8] In particular regulators know all of this stuff, and have occasionally thought about how to mitigate it. One crude approach might be to have a rule saying something like “brokers should not let their small-dollar retail customers do too many day trades.” Like, if you have a small brokerage account and are constantly buying stocks and selling them an hour later, chances are that over the long run you are just transferring money from your account to your broker and a market maker. Not you, you have a system, but a lot of people. Your broker might like that, but the regulators, if they are interested in consumer protection, might not. They might tell your broker not to let you do that. “No more than four day trades a week,” the regulators might say. But you have a system! There is something un-American about this proposal. Regulators telling brokers not to let their customers trade too frequently, to protect the customers from themselves? No no no. The customers have a right as Americans to trade as often as they like. They might win! In fact, the US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority did have a rule like this: A customer who made four or more intraday trades in a margin account in any five-business-day period was classified as a “pattern day trader,” and the rule required pattern day traders to have at least $25,000 in their accounts. If you had a small brokerage account, you couldn’t use it to frenetically day-trade stocks. But Finra repealed that rule in April because (1) sure, it’s un-American and (2) look around, man: You can bet on sports in your brokerage account, and it seems quaint to limit you to four day trades a week. On Friday, Bloomberg’s Simone Foxman wrote about the results:
I can see both sides. On the one hand, limiting day trading really isn’t fun. On the other hand, maybe fun isn’t the goal? Prediction market indexesBack in June I joked about prediction market indexes:
I take no pleasure in any of this, but here’s this:
Fine, it’s fine, it’s fine. It’s not literally “events have become more likely.” It’s more like “Democrats have become more likely to win the midterms,” or “New York is going to have a good year across the major sports,” or “a bunch of AI-job-loss bets are becoming more likely” or whatever. And then of course Kalshi will presumably list futures contracts on the indexes — “give investors new ways to trade S&P DJI’s benchmarks on Kalshi,” etc. — so index arbitrage trades will be possible. Buy the “Democrats win the midterms” index contract, sell the underlying Democrats-winning-elections contracts, profit from small price discrepancies. Incidentally. The way stock index arbitrage works is like that: There are 500 stocks in the index or whatever, so you can buy the underlying stocks to replicate the index. The individual stocks are the units that make up the index. Prediction markets are a bit stranger, though, because there is no, like, fundamental atomic unit. Kalshi lists contracts at different levels of granularity: Right now, it lists contracts like “Texas Senate winner?” and “Maine Senate winner?,” but also “Which party will win the U.S. Senate?” and “Midterms: Congress Balance of Power?” Let’s say you were trying to construct an index “bringing together expectations across elections and control of government.” How much weight, in that index, would you give to the price of “Which party will win the U.S. Senate,” and how much weight would you give to the prices of individual senate races? If you were arbitraging that index, is the relevant trade “buy the index, short the underlying races,” or is it “buy the index, short the which-party-to-win-the-senate contract”? Kalshi already has broad contracts, and narrow contracts that feed into them, and arbitrages between the two. Now it will have indexes. Things happenAI Talent War Has Quant Firms Racing to Fund PhDs, Build Labs. Weil Gotshal Leaders Spent Frantic Weekend Trying to Stabilize Law Firm. In Anthropic I.P.O., Goldman and Morgan Stanley Slug It Out for Top Bank. A $300 Billion ‘Debt Wall’ Is Looming Over Private-Equity Backed Companies. The winners and losers of the weight-loss economy. Microsoft Will Offer Buyouts to 60,000 Employees. Bank of England orders review of Revolut’s product approval processes. Janus Launches First Tokenized Fund Licensing the Nasdaq-100 Index. DWS to honour just 10% of redemption requests at flagship property fund. DoorDash Is in Advanced Talks to Acquire Delivery Rival Instacart. Ben & Jerry’s Founders Have Been Exploring Deal to Separate Company From Magnum. GM to Leave NYSE for Stock Listing on Tech-Focused Nasdaq. ‘Treehouse of Horror’ ranking. If you’d like to get Money Stuff in handy email form, right in your inbox, please subscribe at this link. Or you can subscribe to Money Stuff and other great Bloomberg newsletters here. Thanks! ![]() [1] “Any one of the 12 Operational Milestones can be matched with any one of the 12 Market Capitalization Milestones.” [2] “The first tranche milestone is a market capitalization of $2 trillion; the next nine tranches thereafter each require an additional $500 billion in market capitalization for the shares underlying such tranche to become Earned Shares, up to $6.5 trillion; the last two tranches each require an additional $1 trillion in market capitalization for the shares underlying such tranche to become Earned Shares, requiring $8.5 trillion market capitalization for the last tranche.” [3] The last three are all $400 billion; that is, Tesla needs to make $400 billion “over three non-overlapping periods, each made up of four consecutive quarters.” [4] There are some other possible change-of-control triggers (about board replacement, etc.) that seem unlikely to apply in practice. The main one is: “‘Change in Control’ means … a change in the ownership of the Company which occurs on the date that any one person, or more than one person acting as a group (‘Person’), acquires ownership of the stock of the Company that, together with the stock held by such Person, constitutes more than fifty percent (50%) of the total voting power of the stock of the Company; provided, however, that for purposes of this subsection (a), the acquisition of additional stock by any one Person, who is considered to own more than fifty percent (50%) of the total voting power of the stock of the Company will not be considered a Change in Control. Further, if the shareholders of the Company immediately before such change in ownership continue to retain immediately after the change in ownership, in substantially the same proportions as their ownership of shares of the Company’s voting stock immediately prior to the change in ownership, direct or indirect beneficial ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the total voting power of the stock of the Company or of the ultimate parent entity of the Company, such event shall not be considered a Change in Control under this subsection (a).” So an all-stock merger in which Tesla is the (larger) acquiring company is not a change of control: The pre-merger Tesla shareholders own more than 50% of the total voting power of the surviving company, “in substantially the same proportions as their ownership” of pre-merger Tesla. But an all-stock merger in which Tesla is the (smaller) acquired company seems to be a change of control: The pre-merger Tesla shareholders own less than 50% of the surviving company. Of course there’s a lot of overlap between Tesla and SpaceX shareholders, so arguably the pre-merger Tesla shareholders *do* end up with more than 50% of the surviving company. But “in substantially the same proportions”? Surely not. In particular, the reference to *voting power* seems decisive: In a SpaceX/Tesla merger with SpaceX surviving, Musk (by virtue of his ownership of super-voting shares of SpaceX) would likely control a majority of the total votes, very much unlike his current situation at Tesla. [5] That is: Musk owns about 5.57 billion SpaceX Class B shares (out of 5.6 billion total), and about 849.5 million Class A shares (out of about 8.25 billion total). The Class B shares get 10 votes per share, giving him about 88% of the total voting power. (The filings I am citing are a little inconsistent, because they are from different times, so don’t take this too literally, but this is about right.) He owns about 699.6 million shares of Tesla, out of 3.95 billion total, so he has about 18%. I’m assuming that (1) SpaceX is worth $2 trillion, (2) Tesla is worth $1.5 trillion, and (3) the merger divides up value on that basis, meaning that Tesla shareholders get about 42.9% of the combined company and SpaceX shareholders get the other 57.1%. I’m also assuming that SpaceX is the surviving company, and that all Tesla shares get converted into SpaceX Class A (low-vote) shares at a ratio of about 2.63 SpaceX shares per Tesla share. (This is much higher than you’d get by just dividing the price of Tesla stock by the price of SpaceX stock, I assume because Tesla’s reported market cap reflects more options, convertibles, etc., than SpaceX’s does; again don’t take this math too seriously.) At that ratio, the surviving company would have about 24.2 billion shares outstanding (13.9 billion from SpaceX and 10.4 billion from Tesla), of which 5.6 billion would be high-vote Class B shares mostly belonging to Musk. Musk would own about 5.57 billion Class B shares, as well as about 2.69 billion Class A shares (reflecting his Tesla stock as well as some existing SpaceX Class As), giving him about 58 billion out of 75 billion votes. [6] This is all loose and static, and in fact arguably the discount on your BDC should increase because it is blending in my BDC’s (more discounted) loans. [7] We talked in April about a proposal by Rezolve Ai to buy Commerce.com for $1.44 per share in Rezolve stock. Commerce.com sensibly said no, because its stock was trading at $2.73. Rezolve said, no no no, you have it all wrong: “Wall Street values Rezolve Ai at $11.00, nearly 4x the current trading price,” so really Rezolve’s proposed deal was worth “$5.50 of implied value per [Commerce.com] share.” I found this very funny, but is that a teeeeeny bit what is happening here? [8] Last week the Wall Street Journal had a good interview with the chief executive officer of Charles Schwab, who absolutely knows this and doesn’t pretend not to. He “noted that many of the firms pushing for agentic trading are those whose profits depend largely on the volume of customer trades,” and added that “some of these are firms that describe gambling as an asset class.” (True!) Follow Us You received this message because you are subscribed to Bloomberg’s Money Stuff newsletter. If a friend forwarded you this message, sign up here to get it in your inbox.
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