🔮 Does AI make you dumb? And why our forecasts suck #576
- Azeem Azhar, Exponential View <exponentialview@substack.com>
- Hidden Recipient <hidden@emailshot.io>
The Sunday edition is usually reserved for paying members, but today we’re opening it to everyone. To get it every week, become a member. 🔮 Does AI make you dumb? And why our forecasts suck #576Plus, jobs in high demand, ByteDance, anti-drone nets++Hi all, This week, we published a framework to explain why individuals are getting more productive with AI, but firms often are not. Make this your weekend reading. If you want me to speak to your board about this, now is the time to book me for the fall. Linear knives in exponential gunfightsA column in the Financial Times made a fascinating observation about “the impossible maths of the AI boom.” It pointed out that in the five years to 2030…
Punchy stuff. To get these conclusions about the hyperscalers' ignominious future, the author used “the consensus estimates of analysts for the capital expenditures and revenues between 2025 and 2030.” This all sounds reasonable. Equity analysts are, of course, paid very well to understand the companies in their sector and work long hours to do so. A consensus estimate is the average of what these well-heeled professionals think. The problem is that they are, on average, late to regime shifts. In particular, when a technology hits a learning curve and demand explodes, producing that familiar hockey stick, analysts often stay stuck with their old assumptions. Yes, yes, exponential curves don’t, in the real world, go on forever. But when they are going on, they are, in fact, non-linear. And the straight line and the exponential curve don’t fit well. You can see this by a simple evaluation of just how well analysts have made sense of booming AI demand. When you or I spend money with OpenAI or Anthropic, the majority of it ends up with the hyperscalers, who, in turn, are pouring hundreds of billions into buying chips, memory, and other trinkets. While Wall St analysts don’t formally track Anthropic because it is a private company, they do track those firms in the supply chain. Micron for on. Micron is an American company that makes advanced memory popular with hyperscalers. LLMs chew through memory, and Micron has done well as a result. But how well did the equity analysts covering Micron do? The chart below shows the consensus estimates for Micron’s earnings per share. Pay attention to the purple line, which is FY2026. As late as December 2025, the consensus view was that Micron would deliver about $18.25 EPS. Five months later, with some early data to help them, the median view is now about $58. So what was the point of the $18.25 forecast? Of course, Micron isn’t a hyperscaler. But it is unusually exposed to AI. Only three companies make fancy high-bandwidth memory; Micron was the minnow and the only American player. Maybe this pattern of revisions was an exception, not the rule. Maybe Micron was just … weird. So consider a larger company like Google, with a 20-year track record. AI, understandably, is only a small part of the firm’s $300 billion revenue business. If you and I are buying heaps of tokens from Google, it’s just a drop in its overall business. But even then, between May 2025 and May 2026, the median analyst view on Google grew by 40%. What to expect with your expectationsWe all know what a share price is. It’s the price right now that's tradable on a stock exchange. But it represents a view of the future: a compressed probability distribution over future outcomes for the business. If a stock price reflects the market’s view now, an analyst's target represents something specific. It is their expectations for the stock’s value. Michael Mauboussin, a bit of a guru in the world of finance, has one of the best definitions of expected value: “the weighted-average value for a distribution of possible outcomes” of a company. So when you, I, or an analyst determines a share price target, we aren’t just choosing a number. We are expressing the outcome of the probability calculation, a distribution across possible futures for that asset. The keyword is distribution. And the shape of that distribution depends on your assumptions. If you think this is a linear, business-as-usual technology, you will make one set of assumptions. You’ll be ignoring the adoption rate, cost declines, performance improvements, or the possibility of an extreme outcome. You haven’t just chosen the wrong point on the curve. You’ve chosen the wrong curve. Sorry, sir, I misjudged the speed of that iceberg. And yet you constantly revise your expectations upwards, chasing the puck rather than getting ahead of it. Below, you can see the median analyst consensus for three companies with varying exposure to the AI wave. I’ve plotted that median expected value from 12 months ago to a month ago. They keep revising higher and are still well below what the market thinks right now. These revisions are significant. Analysts aren’t just missing the number once. They are missing it repeatedly. That isn’t bad luck; this is systematic, wilfully blind to what happens with an exponential technology. We’ve seen this before with the IEA and their two decades of comedically ignoring solar’s falling costs. Analysts covering stocks affected by the growth of AI use are doing that. Their model of the world doesn’t accommodate a range of “possible outcomes”, so the expected value (their price target) is wrong. One problem is that no-one in the major banks really covers AI in its entirety. You have chip, cloud, and software analysts. But the action, the demand action, is in private companies. A second problem is that time and again, the market is good at digesting financial information and poor at stomaching technological change. There is a sociological dimension at play, not exactly a kind of groupthink, but an intellectual tic at work. One example is reversion to the mean. Mean reversion, the idea that you can’t stay off a long-term trend for long, is a powerful heuristic. And it works most of the time, but there are some processes, especially compounding ones, where it is less helpful. Reversion is meanJPMorgan published a chart showing consensus forecasts for hyperscaler capex and R&D as a proportion of revenues. This is a data set similar to the one above, although it tells a different story, as it shows not raw dollars but share of revenue.
Assuming the hyperscalers are acting rationally, only three things could drive that slump.
Which of those three reasons can it be? On the second, it is not the job of an infrastructure analyst to forecast scientific breakthroughs, which even Demis Hassabis or Yann LeCun can’t. So it can’t be the second. Nor can it be the third — forecasting a massive exogenous tail-risk shock, a black swan that suddenly arrests the global economy, is also not their job. They are not paid to be Nostradamus. So the only possible reason is reason number one. But we’re halfway through the year; everyone is caught by growth rates, including the AI labs themselves, so what are these analysts seeing that no one else is? Nothing. The reasoning is inchoate. Truth is, exponential shifts involve regime changes, not merely rerating¹. That is uncomfortable. It is easier to assume reversion to the mean than to update your models, which worked so well in the past, with one which is dynamic, uncertain, full of feedback loops and, crucially, depends on the future being radically different to the past. That seems like hard work at best, crackpot at worst. Easier to tweak and tweak old faithful. Let’s go back to the column in the FT which questioned the rationale of AI capex investments based on consensus analyst forecasts. There is an important caveat this particular argument needs to acknowledge: it relied on consensus forecasts from a class of models that have been wrong, sometimes by an order of magnitude, on the very thing their forecasts are used for. The lesson isn’t that analysts are too pessimistic and should just revise higher. It is that consensus forecasts that are built on the intuitions of mean reversion are the wrong thing to use during regime change. It’s not about whether the numbers will surprise to the upside. It’s whether the framework can even see what’s coming. Don’t take a linear knife to an exponential gun fight. AI is making us |
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How to weigh a cell. A nice piece by Niko McCarty
Anti-drone nets in Ukraine:
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Thanks for reading!
Rerating is a fancy Wall St word that means “we’ve decided the thing we are looking at is now a different type of thing.”
I usually handwrite my essays and then read them aloud to Claude for transcription. Close-in edits happen on pen and paper on printouts. Final edits are back on the keyboard.
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